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century”, someone whose ideas have become “indispensable 
for some of mathematical economics and game theory”. Yet, 
according to Senn, “Stackelberg’s contributions were relatively 
unusual in that he did not develop, and could not have 
developed, all of his ideas to their full potential.” Indeed, writes 
Senn, “practically all of game theory were not yet invented” 
during Stackelberg’s time (1905–1946).
In 1934, Stackelberg published Market Forms and 
Equilibrium, which introduced the “leadership game model” in 
which there are leaders, who move first, and followers, who 
move next. Although Stackelberg’s idea was formulated to 
address market behaviours, such as price-setting and sales 
strategies, the leader and follower model neatly captures the 
strategic interaction between security agencies and human 
adversaries. The security agency, as leader, develops a strategy 
and implements it, while the adversary, as follower, observes 
the implementation of the strategy before taking action.
In casting the security problem as a Stackelberg game, the 
Teamcore group at USC has developed new algorithms for 
solving such games and devising randomised patrolling or 
inspection strategies. These algorithms have led to successes 
and advances in security scheduling and allocation by 
addressing a key weakness in human-designed approaches: 
that of predictability.  In what follows, we will first introduce 
the general security games model, before giving an example 
of how it is applied in a real-world setting, and how the 
performance of these algorithms can be assessed.
Security games
In Stackelberg security games, a defender must perpetually 
defend a set of targets using a limited number of resources, 
whereas the attacker is able to surveil and learn the 
defender’s strategy and attack after careful planning. The 
goal for both defender and attacker is to maximise their 
utility – a concept used in economics and artificial intelligence 
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In October 1984, the British Conservative Party gathered in the seaside town of Brighton for its annual conference. Party leader and prime minister Margaret Thatcher was in attendance, as was her cabinet of government ministers – 
all of whom were staying in the town’s aptly-named Grand Hotel. 
Four weeks earlier, the hotel had welcomed Patrick Magee, 
a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as a guest – 
though staff did not know it at the time. Magee was staying 
under the false name of Roy Walsh, and during his stay, he 
planted a bomb on a long-delay timer in the bathroom wall of 
room number 629.
At 2:54am on 12 October 1984, the timer ran out. Thatcher 
– the target of the bomb – was unhurt in the ensuing blast. 
Thirty-six others were not so fortunate: five died, and 31 
were injured. In taking responsibility for the bombing, the IRA 
acknowledged the part luck, both good and bad, had played 
in the outcome of this devastating event. “Today we were 
unlucky,” it said, “but remember we only have to be lucky 
once. You will have to be lucky always.”
This idea – that attackers have many opportunities to 
achieve their goals, and need succeed only once – has echoed 
down the years and remains relevant to our present-day 
concerns regarding security. Whether it is a question of 
protecting public transportation and other critical national 
infrastructure from terrorists, or curtailing the illegal flow of 
weapons, drugs, and money across international borders, 
there are many more potential targets (or weak points) than 
there are resources to defend them. Defences must therefore 
be deployed intelligently. But how?
Game theory, which models interactions among multiple 
self-interested agents, is well suited to the adversarial 
reasoning required to solve this type of resource allocation 
and scheduling problem. Non-cooperative game theory, in 
particular, “deals largely with how intelligent individuals interact 
with one another in an effort to achieve their own goals”, 
says UCLA economist David Levine (bit.ly/2cQojuR). The 
emergence of game theory as a field of research is often dated 
to 1944, with the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern’s text, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. 
However, in looking to solve our modern security challenges, 
a team of researchers at the University of Southern California 
(USC) have taken inspiration from work first published in 1934 
by the German economist, Heinrich von Stackelberg.
Leaders and followers
The late economist Peter Senn described Stackelberg as “one 
of the seminal thinkers in economics of the middle twentieth 
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to measure the importance of, or values assigned to, objects 
or outcomes. In this scenario, a defender maximises their 
utility by safeguarding their most valuable assets; an attacker 
maximises their utility by scoring a successful hit on a valuable 
target. For each target, there is a set of payoff values that 
define the utilities for both the defender and the attacker in 
case of a successful attack or failed attack.
To maximise their utility, both defenders and attackers take 
actions. An action, or pure strategy, for the defender represents 
deploying a set of resources on patrols or checkpoints, such 
as scheduling checkpoints at an airport or assigning federal 
air marshals to protect flight tours. The pure strategy for an 
attacker represents an attack on a target – a flight, for example. 
A defender can also adopt a mixed strategy, which is a 
probability distribution over the pure strategies. 
Table 1 illustrates a simple two-target security game. In each 
cell, the first number is the defender’s payoff while the second 
number is the attacker’s payoff. If target 2 is successfully 
attacked while the defender is stationed at target 1, the 
defender receives a penalty of –2 while the attacker obtains 
a reward of 2. Conversely, if target 2 is successfully defended 
and the attacker is detained, the defender achieves a reward of 
3 and the attacker receives a penalty of –3. 
Since the attacker can observe the defender’s patrolling 
strategy, it is critical that the defender randomise their patrols 
so that the attacker can no longer predict which target the 
defender is going to protect. The solution to a security game 
is, therefore, a mixed strategy for the defender that maximises 
the expected utility of the defender, given that the attacker 
learns the mixed strategy of the defender and chooses a best 
response. This solution concept is known as a “Stackelberg 
equilibrium”, which can be computed by solving an 
optimisation problem. For example, in the two-target game in 
Table 1, if the attacker goes for target 1, then the defender and 
the attacker’s expected utility, denoted by EUd(1) and EUa(1), at 
target 1 is as follows:
■■ EUd(1) = (probability of protecting target 1) × (reward for 
successfully catching the attacker) + (probability of not 
protecting target 1) × (penalty for not catching the attacker)
■■ EUa(1) = (probability of protecting target 1) × (penalty for being 
caught by the defender) + (probability of not protecting target 
1) × (reward for successfully attacking the target)
Similarly, we can also compute the defender and attacker’s 
expected utility at target 2 if the attacker chooses to attack 
target 2. 
Now, assuming that the defender has only one guard to 
deploy, the optimal mixed strategy for protecting both targets is 
computed by searching over the solution space of all possible 
strategies to find the one that maximises the defender’s utility. 
In the example in Table 1, the optimal strategy is to assign the 
guard to randomly protect target 1 and target 2 40% and 60% 
of the time, respectively. In this scenario, whichever target the 
attacker chooses, its expected utility is -1 and the defender’s 
expected utility is 1. We calculate the defender’s expected utility 
at target 1 as EUd(1) = 0.4 × 4 + 0.6 × (–1) = 1. Any other strategy 
of the defender will lead to a lower expected utility for one or 
both of the targets. For example, if the defender protects target 
1 and 2 90% and 10% of the time, respectively, the best target 
for the attacker is now target 2, since it will obtain the highest 
expected utility at this target. In this case, the defender’s utility 
will be –1.5 (calculated as EUd(2) = 0.9 × (–2) + 0.1 × 3 = –1.5).
Playing for real
Security games and calculations of this sort have been 
used by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) since 2011, 
to protect both passenger ferries and ports by randomising 
patrol strategies. For ferries, the risk is that these vessels – 
transporting millions of passengers each year in waterside 
cities such as Seattle, New York, Boston and San Francisco – 
are an attractive target for an attacker. For example, the attacker 
may ram a suicide boat packed with explosives into a ferry, 
mirroring the attacks carried out on the US Navy destroyer USS 
Cole (see Figure 1) and French supertanker Limburg.1
Small, fast, and well-armed patrol boats (see Figure 2) can 
provide protection to such ferries by detecting the attacker 
within a certain distance and stopping them from attacking. 
However, the numbers of patrol boats are often limited, so the 
FIGURE 1 USS Cole after suicide attack (credit: US Navy, via Wikimedia Commons)
TABLE 1 An example of a two-target Stackelberg security game, showing 
payoff values for defender and attacker. In each cell, the first number is the 
defender’s payoff while the second number is the attacker’s payoff
Attacker
Target 1 Target 2
Defender
Target 1 4, –4 –2, 2
Target 2 –1, 1 3, –3
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defender cannot protect all ferries at all times and locations. 
Teamcore thus developed a game-theoretic system for 
scheduling escort boat patrols to protect ferries, and this has 
been deployed on the Staten Island Ferry since 2013.  
The key research challenge relates to the fact that ferries 
are continuously moving over a wide area, and the attacker 
could attack at any moment in time and location. This type 
of problem leads to game-theoretic models with continuous 
strategy spaces, which presents computational challenges. 
Therefore, the PROTECT-FERRY algorithm that was developed 
uses a compact representation of the defender’s mixed 
strategy space while being able to exactly model the attacker’s 
continuous strategy space. 
Overall, the algorithm casts the ferry protection problem as 
a zero-sum security game in which targets move along a one-
dimensional domain – i.e., a straight-line segment connecting 
two terminal points. This one-dimensional assumption is valid 
as, in ferry protection, ferries normally move back and forth in 
a straight line between two terminals (or ports). Although the 
ferries’ locations will vary with respect to time changes, they 
do have a fixed daily schedule, meaning that, for an attacker, 
determining the locations of potential targets at a certain time 
is straightforward. 
Now, the defender has patrol boats moving between two 
terminals to protect the ferries. While the defender is trying 
to protect these vessels, the attacker will decide to attack a 
certain target at a certain time. The probability that the attacker 
successfully attacks depends on the positions of the patroller 
at that time. Specifically, each patroller possesses a protective 
circle of radius within which they can detect and try to 
intercept any attack, whereas they are incapable of detecting 
the attacker outside that radius.
Figure 3 (page 18) shows an example of a ferry transition 
graph in which each node of the graph indicates a particular 
location and time step for the target. (Note that while we 
describe PROTECT-FERRY in the discretised case, our game-
theoretic solution is generalised to the continuous problem 
setting in reality.) Here, there are three location points, A, B, and 
C, on a straight line, where B lies between A and C. Initially, the 
target is at one of these location points at the 5-minute time 
step. Then the target moves to the next location point, which is 
determined based on the connectivity between these points at 
the 10-minute time step and so on. For example, if the target 
is at location point A at the 5-minute time step, denoted by (A, 
5 min) in the transition graph, it can move to the location point 
B or stay at location point A at the 10-minute time step. The 
defender follows this transition graph to protect the target.  
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Real-world deployments
Teamcore’s algorithms have been used in a number of 
different scenarios. 
■■ ARMOR: the first application, deployed at the Los 
Angeles International Airport in 2007 to randomise 
checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport, and 
canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. 
■■ IRIS: a game-theoretic scheduler for randomised 
deployment of the US federal air marshals has been in 
use since 2009.
■■ PROTECT-PORT: which schedules the US Coast Guard’s 
randomised patrolling of ports, has been deployed 
in the port of Boston since April 2011 and has been in 
use at the port of New York since February 2012. It has 
spread to other ports, such as Los Angeles/Long Beach 
and Houston.
■■ PROTECT-FERRY: an application for deploying escort 
boats to protect ferries has been deployed by the US 
Coast Guard since April 2013.
■■ TRUSTS: has been evaluated in field trials by the Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department in the LA Metro system. 
■■ PAWS: another game-theoretic application, was 
initially tested by rangers in Uganda for protecting 
wildlife in Queen Elizabeth National Park in April 
2014. The application was then extensively tested by 
rangers for protecting wildlife in a conservation area in 
Malaysia in July 2015.
■■ MIDAS: was tested by the US Coast Guard for 
protecting fisheries.
FIGURE 2 An escort boat protects a passenger ferry in a video shot by Teamcore researchers 
(see youtu.be/Zc5fp_L-gm4)
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A pure strategy for the defender is defined as a trajectory 
of this graph; for example, the trajectory including (A, 
5 min), (B, 10 min), and (C, 15 min) indicates a pure strategy 
for the defender, moving from point to point sequentially. 
The defender’s mixed strategy assigns a probability to 
each of the patrol routes, or pure strategies, that can 
be executed. 
One key challenge of this representation for the defender’s 
pure strategies is that the transition graph consists of an 
exponential number of trajectories, NT, where N is the 
number of location points and T is the number of time steps. 
To address this challenge, PROTECT-FERRY proposes a 
compact representation of the defender’s mixed strategy. 
Instead of directly computing a probability distribution over 
complete trajectories of the graph for the defender, PROTECT-
FERRY attempts to compute the marginal probability that the 
defender will follow a certain edge of the transition graph, for 
example the probability of being at the node (A, 5 min) and 
moving to the node (B, 10 min). This compact representation 
allows PROTECT-FERRY to reformulate the resource-
allocation problem as computing the optimal marginal 
coverage of the defender over a small number of the edges of 
the transition graph.
Given the values of ferries and the distances they travel, 
PROTECT-FERRY then provides an optimal mixed strategy 
for the defender which can be represented as a transition 
probability distribution. For example, in Figure 3, the probability 
that the defender is at (A, 5 min) and moves to (B, 10 min) can 
be set to 10%, while the probability of being at (B, 10 min) and 
moving to (C, 15 min) can be 7%. The other transition edges will 
be assigned a probability in a similar fashion. 
This optimal transition probability distribution is computed 
by searching over the solution space of all possible transition 
distributions to find an optimal solution that maximises the 
defender’s utility. PROTECT-FERRY then casts these transition 
probabilities into detailed patrol schedules for the defender 
to follow. 
How well does this work?
Demonstrating the effectiveness of these algorithmic solutions 
is important – lives are at stake, after all. However, no evidence 
can be provided that these algorithms provide 100% security 
– there is no such thing. The question to ask, then, is whether 
these game-theoretic algorithms are better at allocating 
security resources than other methods, which typically rely on 
human schedulers or a simple dice roll. 
5 min 10 min 15 min
A A, 5 min A, 10 min A, 15 min
B B, 5 min B, 10 min B, 15 min
C C, 5 min C, 10 min C, 15 min
FIGURE 3 An example of a ferry transition graph
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FIGURE 4 PROTECT-PORT evaluation results: (a) pre-deployment and (b) post-deployment patrols. Coloured lines represent different patrol areas, or likely targets
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For measures of interest to security agencies, such as 
predictability in patrol schedules, it is possible to compare 
the actual human-generated schedules to those designed by 
algorithm. Consider the following evaluation of PROTECT-PORT, 
another algorithm designed for the USCG, which schedules the 
randomised patrolling of ports. Figure 4 shows the frequency 
of visits by USCG to different patrol areas (represented by the 
different coloured lines) over a number of weeks. The x-axis 
represents the day of the week and the y-axis is the number 
of times a patrol area is visited for a given day of the week. 
The patrols before PROTECT, in Figure 4(a), show a definite 
pattern, with a spike on day 5, and a dearth of patrols on day 
2 – a pattern that terrorists might easily exploit. Besides this, 
the lines in Figure 4(a) intersect frequently, indicating that on 
some days a higher-value target was visited more often while 
on other days it was visited less often, even though the value 
of a target does not change from day to day. This means that 
there was not a consistently high frequency of coverage of 
higher-value targets before PROTECT. In Figure 4(b), game-
theoretic schedulers are seen to perform significantly better by 
avoiding predictability and ensuring that more important targets 
are covered with a higher frequency of patrols. The pattern of 
low patrols on day 2 disappears. Furthermore, lines no longer 
intersect frequently, meaning that higher-value targets are 
visited consistently throughout the week. 
Conclusion
Security is recognised as a global challenge and game 
theory is an increasingly important paradigm for reasoning 
about complex security resource allocation. As described, 
the general model of security games is applicable (with 
appropriate variations) to varied security scenarios and there 
are applications deployed in the real world (see box, page 17) 
that have led to measurable improvements in security. 
But while the deployed game-theoretic applications have 
shown a promising start, a significant amount of research 
remains to be done. These are large-scale interdisciplinary 
research challenges that call upon multi-agent researchers 
to work with researchers in other disciplines, as well as being 
“on the ground” with domain experts examining real-world 
constraints and challenges that cannot be abstracted away. ■
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